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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In this case, Brian Cobler asks this Court to revisit the proper analysis for a claim 
that a criminal statute is void for vagueness on its face. This Court has previously held 
that, for some criminal statutes, the proper enquiry for whether the statute is facially 
vague is whether the reviewing court can identify a core of circumstances to which the 
statute could be lawfully applied and whether the law is vague in all of its applications. 
See State v. Hellickson, 135 Idaho 742, 745, 24 P.3d 59, 62 (2001); State v. Bitt, 118 
Idaho 584, 587-588, 798 P.2d 43, 46-47 (1990). Mr. Cobler asserts that this standard of 
review is not proper when the statute being challenged as facially vague is a criminal 
statute. 
Mr. Cobler pleaded guilty to sexual battery of a minor child, sixteen or seventeen 
years of age and received a unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed. 
Mr. Cobler appeals, asserting that the district court imposed an excessive sentence, 
and thereby abused its discretion, and that the district court abused its discretion when 
it denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion for a reduction of 
sentence. Mr. Cobler also challenges the no contact order entered against him as 
vague, overbroad, unduly restrictive of his parental rights, and outside the scope of the 
authority granted pursuant to I.C. § 18-920 and I.C.R. 46.2. As such, Mr. Cobler asserts 
that the district court abused its discretion when it entered the criminal no contact order 
against him and when the court denied his motion to modify the no contact order 
entered against him. 
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Police received a report that Brian Cobler and his wife were sexually involved 
with a seventeen year old girl. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), 
p.2.) The parents of the victim were the persons who filed the report with police. (PSI, 
p.2.) The victim's parents discovered the sexual relationship when they found love 
letters, emails, and pictures that indicated their daughter was sexually involved with 
Mr. Cobler and his wife. (PSI, p.2.) As a result of the report from the victim's parents, 
police searched Mr. Cobler's residence and his wife's car and found notes to the girl 
along with sexually explicit material. (PSI, p.2.) 
Upon Mr. Cobler's arraignment, the district court entered a no contact order that 
precluded Mr. Cobler from contacting the victim and "all minors." (10/17/06 Tr., p.6, L.9 
- p.7, L.8; R., p.7.) Given that the order prohibited contacts with "all minors," the order 
precluded Mr. Cobler from having any contact or making any attempt to contact his 
three children. (R., p.7; PSI, p.15.) Among the contacts prohibited by the terms of this 
order are contacts in person; through another person; in writing or email; by telephone, 
pager, or facsimile; attempts to contact, harass, follow, or communicate with the alleged 
victim or any person under the age of 18; or knowingly remaining within 100 feet of the 
alleged victim or any person under the age of 18. (R., p.7.) The order did not provide 
for any of the available exceptions, including permission for Mr. Cobler to respond to 
emergencies involving his own children. (R., p.7.) And nothing in the no contact order 
provides any exception for inadvertent or incidental contacts. (R., p.7.) There was no 
date provided for the expiration of this no contact order. (R., p.7.) The only provision 
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for expiration of the order was that it would expire "upon dismissal of the case." 
(R., p.7.) 
Mr. Cobler pleaded guilty to sexual battery of a minor child, sixteen or seventeen 
years of age. (Tr., 2/16/07, p.6, L.13 - p.7, L.4.) Prior to imposing sentence, the district 
court ordered a psychological evaluation of Mr. Cobler for purposes of sentencing. 
(R., pp.29-30.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with two 
years fixed. (Tr., 6/6/07, p.27, Ls.5-9.) 
Mr. Cobler then presented the court with a Rule 35 motion for a reduction of his 
sentence. (Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence 1. pp.1-8; Motion for 
Reconsideration of Sentence, pp.1-2.) He also moved the court to modify the no 
contact order entered against him on October 17, 2006, because this no contact order 
precluded him from having any contact with his own children. (R., p.7; Motion to Modify 
Protection Order, pp.1-3.) The district court denied both motions. (Memorandum 
Decision Re: Defendant's Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35; 
Motion to Modify Protection Order, p.1.; Second Memorandum Decision Re Defendant's 
Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35. 2) Mr. Cobler timely appeals . 
. 
1 Mr. Cobler's Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence, Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence, 
and Motion to Modify Protection Order, and the district court's Memorandum Decision Re Defendant's 
Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to \.C.R. 35 were incorporated into the record via Mr. Cobler's 
Motion to Augment and Suspend the Record, filed on January 15, 2008. 
2 Mr. Cobler has sought to augment the district court's Second Memorandum Decision Re Defendant's 
Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35 into the record via a Motion to Augment the 
Record filed concurrently with this brief. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court act outside the bounds of its authority when it entered a no 
contact order that is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, unduly restrictive of 
Mr. Cobler's fundamental right to maintain contact with his children, and invalid 
due to a lack of any discernible date of expiration or being limited to a named 
person against whom contact is prohibited; and when it denied Mr. Cobler's 
motion to modify the no contact order? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
ten years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Cobler following his plea of guilty to 
sexual battery of a minor child, sixteen or seventeen years of age? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Cobler's Rule 35 
Motion for a Reduction of Sentence? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The No Contact Order Entered Against Mr. Cobler Was Vague. Overbroad. Unduly 
Restrictive Of His Parental Rights. Contains No Date Of Expiration. And Is Entered In 
Favor Of A Class Of Persons Rather Than Just A Named Person: And Therefore The 
District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Entered The No Contact Order Against 
Mr. Cobler And When The District Court Denied Mr. Cobler's Motion To Modify The 
Order 
A. Introduction 
At the time of his arraignment, the district court entered a no contact order 
against Mr. Cobler that continues to be in force. (10/17/06 Tr., p.4, L.1 - p.7, L.14; 
R., p.7.) Mr. Cobler subsequently moved the court to modify the no contact order so 
that he would be able to have some contact with his three children. (Motion to Modify 
Protection Order, pp.1-3.) The court summarily denied this motion. (Motion to Modify 
Protection Order, p.1.) 
The decision of whether to enter a no contact order pursuant to I.C. § 18-920 is a 
matter within the discretion of the district court. See LC.§ 18-920(1). However, as with 
any exercise of discretion on the part of the district court, that discretion must be 
exercised in a manner that is consistent with applicable legal standards, including 
constitutional standards. See, e.g., State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 568, 165 P.3d 273, 
282 (2007); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 606, 607, 167 P.3d 357, 358 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Mr. Cobler contends that this no contact order is unconstitutionally overbroad and 
vague; that it is invalid because it fails to contain a date of expiration, and is entered in 
favor of a class of persons rather than just an identifiable individual; and that it 
unconstitutionally interferes with his fundamental rights as a parent. Therefore, 
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because the no contact order entered against Mr. Cobler is contrary to applicable law, 
Mr. Cobler asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it entered the no 
contact order and denied his motion to modify this order. 
B. The District Court Failed To Act Within The Bounds Of Its Discretion When It 
Entered A No Contact Order Against Mr. Cobler Based On A Statute And Court 
Rule That Are Overbroad On Their Face And The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion When It Entered A No Contact Order That Was Overbroad As Applied 
To Mr. Cobler 
Mr. Cobler contends that the language employed by the no contact order entered 
against him, and the statutory provisions and criminal rules that authorize the entry of 
criminal no contact orders, are overbroad on their face and as applied to the facts in 
Mr. Cobler's case. As such, the district court abused its discretion when it entered the 
no contact order against him, and when the district court refused to modify this order. 
1. The Statute And Criminal Rule Governing Criminal No Contact Orders Are 
Facially Overbroad 
Criminal no contact orders are authorized under J.C.§ 18-920, which permits the 
district court to enter a no contact order when a defendant is charged with or convicted 
of a list of enumerated offenses, or for "any other offense for which a court finds that a 
no contact order is appropriate." J.C. § 18-920(1). This statute makes it a criminal 
offense to violate such a no contact order. I.C. § 18-920. The specific minimum 
requirements for issuance of such an order are enumerated in I.C.R. 46.2. Neither the 
statute authorizing the issuance of criminal no contact orders, nor the court rule 
regulating the content and manner of execution of these orders, contains any provision 
for inadvertent or incidental contacts. Mr. Cobler contends that, because there is no 
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provision for inadvertent or incidental contacts, both the relevant statute and court rule 
are facially overbroad. 
A statute that regulates speech, association, or expressive conduct that is 
protected by the First Amendment is facially overbroad if a substantial number of the 
statute's applications are unconstitutional judged in relation to the statute's plainly 
legitimate sweep. Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 
_U.S._, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1191, n.6 (2008). This Court begins an examination of 
whether a statute or order is facially overbroad with first determining whether the statute 
regulates constitutionally protected conduct. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,614 
(1973); State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 714, 69 P.3d 126, 134 (2003). Here, there is 
no statutory definition for what constitutes "contact," but the conduct that is proscribed 
by no contact orders includes prohibitions against communications and associations 
between the person against whom the order is issued and the person for whom the 
order is intended to protect. Therefore, these orders operate as an injunction that 
prevents certain communications and associations with another individual or class of 
individuals. See also BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, p.800 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "injunction" 
as a court order commanding or preventing an action). 
The right to communicate and the right of association with others are among the 
activities that are constitutionally protected conduct under the First Amendment of the 
United States constitution, which is made applicable to the states through the Due 
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., U.S. v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 
310, 322 (1990) (First Amendment embraces the freedom to effectively communicate 
with others); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960); cf. Elk Grove 
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Unified School Dist. V. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17 (2004) (recognizing in dicta that a 
parent's right to communicate with his or her child is protected under the First 
Amendment). As such, criminal no contact orders regulate constitutionally protected 
conduct. See also Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) 
(treating an injunction against anti-abortion protestors as a prior restraint on speech). 
Once it has been determined that the challenged statute or order regulates 
constitutionally protected conduct, the next step in the analysis requires a determination 
of whether the statute precludes a significant amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 713, 69 P.3d at 133. If the overbreadth is substantial, 
the law may not be enforced against anyone until the reach of the law is narrowed by 
legislative action, judicial construction, or partial invalidation. Id. at 714, 69 P.3d at 134. 
However, overbreadth is not substantial if, despite some impermissible applications, the 
remainder of the statute covers conduct that is easily identifiable and the conduct may 
be constitutionally proscribed. Id. Because the criminal no contact orders at issue in 
this appeal operate as injunctions that impose a prior restraint on speech, this Court 
also must determine that the restraint is "no broader than necessary to achieve its 
desired goals." Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765; see also State v. Hague, 547 N.W.2d 173, 
176 (S.D. 1996) (applying the above standard from Madsen to terms of a domestic 
violence protection order). 
In this case, the relevant statute, I.C. § 18-920, and the court rule governing 
proper execution of no contact orders, I.C.R. 46.2, suffer from substantial 
unconstitutional overbreadth. There is nothing in the language of I.C. § 18-920 or I.C.R. 
46.2 that restricts what crimes may be used as a basis to enter a no contact order. 
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There is no definition of "contact" provided in the statute, related statutes, or the court 
rule. See I.C. § 18-101 et. seq.; !.C.R. 46.2. Because there is no definition of what 
constitutes "contact," there are literally no guidelines as to when criminal liability may 
arise in the case of inadvertent or incidental contacts or contacts that are initiated 
without the consent or any affirmative act on the part of the individual against whom the 
order is entered (such as when the individual with whom contact is precluded is the 
individual who initiates the contact, rather than the person against whom the order is 
entered). 
There is also no requirement of any rational relationship between the underlying 
offense and the person who is protected from contact by the order. See I.C. § 18-920; 
!.C.R. 46.2. The State is empowered to seek, and the district court is empowered to 
enter, a no contact order that could potentially encompass any individual based on the 
State charging a defendant with any criminal offense at all. Moreover, while !.C.R. 46.2 
requires that the no contact order recite a date upon which the order terminates, the rule 
does not restrict how far into the future the date of expiration may extend. Without 
additional meaningful restrictions, the statute and court rule that govern the entry of 
criminal no contact orders unjustifiably preclude a significant amount of constitutionally 
protected conduct. 
The current statute and court rule, I.C. § 18-920 and !.C.R. 46.2, permit entry of 
an order with terms that are far broader than necessary to achieve the State's goals. 
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765. The statute and court rule do not delineate what specific 
types of contacts are prohibited or define the term "contact," do not require a 
relationship between the person against whom contact is prohibited and the underlying 
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crime, do not limit what crimes may serve as the basis for the underlying order, and do 
not provide any specific limitation on how long these orders are allowed to persist as 
enforceable. Therefore the statute and court rule are facially overbroad. 
2. The No Contact Order Entered Against Mr. Cobler Is Overbroad As 
Applied To The Facts And Circumstances Of This Case 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court determines that the statute and court rule 
governing criminal no contact orders are not facially overbroad, the specific no contact 
order entered against Mr. Cobler in this case was clearly overbroad as applied to him. 
An as-applied challenge to a statute or rule as overbroad requires a determination of 
whether the statute, as applied to the individual raising the challenge, infringes on his or 
her speech or freedom of association as protected by the First Amendment. See 
State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 893, 88 P.3d 704, 712 (2004). 
The no contact order entered against Mr. Cobler is astonishingly broad in -its 
sweep. The order precludes Mr. Cobler from having contact with the alleged victim in 
this case and with "all minors." (R., p.7.) A non-exclusive list of the contacts prohibited 
includes contact in person or through another person; in writing, email, by telephone, 
pager or facsimile, attempting to contact, harass, follow or communicate, or knowingly 
remaining with 100 feet of the victim and all minors. (R., p.7.) There is nothing in the 
no contact order that exempts inadvertent contacts. (R., p.7.) 
A similar issue of overbreadth was recently addressed by the Iowa courts. See 
State v. Hall, 740 N.W.2d 200 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). In Hall, the defendant was 
convicted of sexual exploitation of a minor. Id at 201. The court entered a no contact 
order as part of its sentencing order. Id. In terms almost identical to those at issue in 
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this case, the trial court precluded the defendant from having any contacts or 
communications with any child under 18 years of age, and also ordered that the 
defendant was precluded from being in the immediate vicinity of locations where 
children are normally found. Id. The provision preventing the defendant from being 
present in locations where children would normally be found included an exception for 
incidental contacts, which is an additional restriction on the defendant's potential for 
criminal liability that is not present in this case. Id. 
The defendant in Hall challenged the provisions of the no contact order as being 
overbroad. Id. at 203. The court determined that the provision of the no contact order 
that prevented communication with a minor was overbroad in that it did not contain any 
exception for incidental contact. Id. at 204-205. The court noted that, without such an 
exception, the defendant would face a "day-to-day impossibility" in attempting to comply 
with the order, and that a total ban on communications "would, in effect, require Hall to 
become a hermit." Id. at 204. The court found that there was no justification for 
forbidding the defendant from incidental contact with minors. Id. at 205. Without some 
provision for incidental contacts, the court in Hall determined that the terms of the no 
contact order were overbroad. Id. 
Here, there is even greater reason than in Hall to find that the no contact order 
entered against Mr. Cobler was overbroad. The offense that he pleaded guilty to did not 
involve young children. (Tr., 2/16/07, p.6, L.13 - p.7, L.4.) There was a specific 
conclusion in this case that Mr. Cobler is not a sexual predator, and he has no prior 
record of any sexual offense. (PSI, p.10; Psychosexual Evaluation, pp.15-16.) There is 
a complete absence in this record of any indication that Mr. Cobler can be reasonably 
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viewed as a danger to his own children, who fall within the terms of the no contact 
order. 
Like the provision of the order found to be overbroad in Hall, there is also no 
provision in Mr. Cobler's case for inadvertent or incidental contacts or communications 
with minors. The no contact order entered against Mr. Cobler precludes him from any 
contacts with an individual under the age of 18, whether, "in person or through another 
person or in writing or email, or by telephone, pager, or facsimile." (R., p.7.) The order 
also precludes him from attempting to make any contacts or any communications 
whatsoever. (R., p.7.) 
There is nothing in the no contact order entered against Mr. Cobler that provides 
an exception where an individual under the age of 18 is the person to initiate the 
contact. (R., p.7.) As such, if Mr. Cobler were to ever make any response to a question 
or statement presented to him by someone under the age of 18, he is exposed to 
criminal liability for violation of his no contact order. See I.C. § 18-920. Likewise, there 
is no exception for any instance where Mr. Cobler would unknowingly be speaking or 
communicating in any way to an individual under the age of 18. And, as will be 
discussed more fully below, the plain terms of this order prevent Mr. Cobler from having 
contact with his own children, who are the most important people in Mr. Cobler's life and 
who have never been shown to be in any danger from Mr. Cobler. (R., p.7.) 
The provisions of the no contact order entered against Mr. Cobler unjustifiably 
preclude a significant amount of constitutionally protected speech and related rights of 
association. In absence of any provision for inadvertent or incidental contacts, either for 
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the presence of minors or for contacts with minors, the no contact order entered against 
Mr. Cobler is unconstitutionally overbroad. 
C. The District Court Failed To Act Within The Bounds Of Its Discretion When It 
Entered A No Contact Order Against Mr. Cobler Based On A Statute And Court 
Rule That Are Unconstitutionally Vague On Their Face And As Applied To 
Mr. Cobler 
1. Prior Precedent From The Idaho Supreme Court Has Applied An Incorrect 
Standard For Facial Vagueness In The Context Of Criminal Statutes 
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Cobler asks this Court to clarify the correct standard 
of review for facial vagueness challenges in the context of criminal statutes. 
Specificallv · ~obler asks this Court to clarify that, in the context of criminal statutes, 
a fac' 
,.___,. 
gueness challenge does not require a showing that the statute is 
,.onally vague in all its applications, in light of U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
1erally, the doctrine of stare decisis requires a court to follow controlling 
precedent unless there is a compelling reason to depart from such precedent. See, 
e.g., State v. Reyes, 131 Idaho 239, 240, 953 P.2d 989, 990 (1998). Such reasons 
include where the controlling precedent is manifestly wrong; where it has proven over 
time to be unwise or unjust; or where overruling the precedent is necessary to vindicate 
plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. Id. Current precedent 
3 This Court should also note that, even under the standard previously applied by Idaho courts from 
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, a showing that the challenged statute is unconstitutionally vague in 
all applications is not required when the statute being challenged as facially vague infringes on First 
Amendment rights. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-
495, 497 (1982). Because, as previously noted, LC.§ 18-920 and I.C.R. 46.2 infringe on constitutionally 
protected First Amendment rights, this is an additional reason why Mr. Cobler may raise his facial 
vagueness challenge to this statute and court rule without being required to show vagueness in all 
applications. 
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from this Court regarding the proper analysis for a facial vagueness challenge to a 
criminal statute is manifestly wrong in that it is contrary to the express holdings of the 
United States Supreme Court. Overruling this precedent is also necessary to vindicate 
plain, obvious principles of law. As such, Mr. Cobler requests that this Court revisit its 
prior precedent and clarify that it is not necessary to demonstrate vagueness in all 
applications of a criminal statute in order to demonstrate that a criminal statute is 
unconstitutionally vague on its face. 
Prior precedent from this Court concludes that, in order for a facial vagueness 
challenge to a criminal statute to be successful, the complainant must demonstrate that 
the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 
P.3d at 132; State v. Hellickson, 135 Idaho 742, 745, 24 P.3d 59, 62 (2001); State v. 
Prather, 135 Idaho 770, 773, 25 P.3d 83, 87 (2001); State v. Leferink, 133 Idaho 780, 
784, 992 P.2d 775, 779 (1999); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 199, 969 P.2d 244, 248 
(1998); State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 587, 798 P.2d 43, 46 (1990). These decisions 
have universally relied upon the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Village of Hoffman 
Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982), as the source of this rule. Korsen, 138 Idaho 
at 712, 69 P.3d at 132; Leferink, 133 Idaho at 784, 992 P.2d at 779; Cobb, 132 Idaho at 
199, 969 P.2d at 248; Bitt, 118 Idaho at 587, 798 P.2d at 46.4 This reliance is 
misplaced because this specific standard from Village of Hoffman Estates has been 
expressly stated by the U.S. Supreme Court to be an improper rule in the context of 
facial vagueness challenges to a criminal statute. Ko/ender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 
4 While Hellickson and Prather cite to Cobb as the legal authority in support of this standard, the Court in 
Cobb cites to Village of Hoffman Estates as the legal authority for this rule. Hellickson, 135 Idaho at 746, 
24 P.3d at 63; Prather, 135 Idaho at 773, 25 P.3d at 86; 
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358 (1983); see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) (plurality 
opinion). 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Village of Hoffman Estates was called upon to 
address the issue of whether a local civil ordinance requiring businesses to obtain a 
license in order to sell certain classes of products was unconstitutionally vague on its 
face. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 491-492. The ordinance at issue was 
civil, rather than criminal, in nature. Id. In the context of this civil statute, the Court held 
that, "a 'facial' challenge, in this context, means a claim that the law is 'invalid in toto -
and therefore incapable of any valid application."' Id. at 495, n.5 (quoting Steffel v. 
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474 (1974)). The Court in Village of Hoffman Estates 
proceeded to clarify that this rule was a "less strict vagueness test" than would normally 
be applied because the ordinance was an economic regulation; and that the "degree of 
vagueness that the Constitution tolerates" depends upon the nature of the enactment. 
Id. at 498. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has subsequently articulated that the standard from 
Village of Hoffman Estates that required a showing that the statute was vague in all of 
its applications is not the correct standard when the statute at issue is criminal. 
Ko/ender, 461 U.S. at 358. In Ko/ender, the Court articulated several reasons why this 
standard was inapplicable where the statute being challenged is a criminal statute. 
Importantly, the Court placed heavy emphasis on the fact that, where a statute imposes 
criminal penalties, "the standard of certainty is higher." Ko/ender, 461 U.S. at 358, n.8. 
In other words, the Court will require more definiteness to the language of criminal 
statutes in order to pass constitutional muster, and will correspondingly impose greater 
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scrutiny to claims that a criminal statute is unconstitutionally void for vagueness. As the 
Court noted, "this concern has, at times, led us to invalidate a criminal statute on its face 
even when it could conceivably have had some valid application." Id. The Court in 
Ko/ender also went on to note that the standard articulated in Village of Hoffman 
Estates can not be appropriately to facial vagueness challenges to criminal statutes 
because, "the ordinance in Hoffman Estates 'simply regulates business behavior,' and 
that 'economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject 
matter is often more narrow."' Id. at 358 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 
at 499). 
Prior Idaho precedent requiring a showing that a criminal statute is impermissibly 
vague in all its applications, and the corollary rule that a criminal statute cannot be 
unconstitutionally vague on its face if the Court can identify "core circumstances" to 
which the statute may be lawfully applied, is directly contrary to the express holding of 
the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the proper standard for facial vagueness challenges 
to a criminal statute. As such, the line of cases articulating this standard are manifestly 
wrong because this standard has been expressly rejected by the United States 
Supreme Court, and this line of cases should be overruled in order to vindicate plain, 
obvious principles of law. 
2. The Statute And Court Rule Governing Criminal No Contact Orders Are 
Unconstitutionally Vague On Their Face 
Mr. Cobler asserts that the statute and court rule governing criminal no contact 
orders are not worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness such that an ordinary 
person could understand what conduct is prohibited. He further asserts that I.C. § 18-
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920 and I.C.R. 46.2 are worded in such a manner that they permit discriminatory and 
arbitrary enforcement. As such, I.C. § 18-920 and I.C.R. 46.2 are unconstitutionally 
vague on their face. 
The void for vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457 (2001 ); Korsen, 138 
Idaho at 711, 69 P.3d at 131. Under this doctrine, a statute or ordinance must "be 
worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people can understand what 
conduct is prohibited and that the statute be worded in a manner that does not allow 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711. As part of the 
guarantee of due process, no individual may be required to speculate as to the meaning 
of a statute where they face the potential loss of liberty as a result. 5 Id. 
The due process clause guarantees that individuals be informed of what the law 
commands or forbids, such that persons of common intelligence will not be forced to 
guess at the meaning of the criminal law. Id. at 712, 69 P.3d at 132. There are two 
primary components to this guarantee: first, that a statute must give adequate notice to 
people of ordinary intelligence as to the conduct proscribed; and second, that the 
statute must establish some minimal guidelines to govern those charged with enforcing 
the statute. Id. Neither requirement is met with regard to I.C. § 18-920 or I.C.R. 46.2. 
The extent of the conduct proscribed is indiscernible under the language of 
I.C. § 18-920. The action prohibited by the statute is having "contact with the stated 
person in violation of an order." I.C. § 18-920(2)(c). As previously noted, there is 
5 This Court should note that I.C. § 18-920 provides that, if a defendant violates the terms of the order, he 
or she may be fined up to $1,000 or imprisoned for up to one year. I.C. § 18-920(4). As such, a person 
faces the potential loss of liberty if he or she violates the terms of I.C. § 18-920. 
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nothing in this statute or the provisions of the title in which the statute is situated that in 
any way defines what constitutes "contact." See I.C. § 18-101, et seq. Similarly, !.C.R. 
46.2 also does not contain a definition of "contact." Moreover, the terms of I.C. § 18-
920 do not appear to require that the contact be accompanied by any specific mental 
state on the part of the defendant; a violation occurs strictly when the person against 
whom the order is entered "has had contact with the stated person in violation of an 
order." I.C. § 18-920(2)(c). 
In absence of any definition to provide guidance as to what is proscribed as a 
"contact," a person of ordinary intelligence would necessarily have to guess as to what 
conduct could potentially expose him or her to criminal liability. The statute and rule do 
not set out whether inadvertent or incidental contacts are punishable as a violation of 
the no contact order. There is also no way of determining whether communication that 
is merely received, but not responded to, by the person subject to the no contact order 
would count as a contact. Given that the State seeks to apply no contact orders to 
preclude contacts with entire classes of persons, it is virtually impossible for a person of 
ordinary intelligence to be able to discern what is permitted and what may be viewed as 
criminal under the provisions I.C. § 18-920 and !.C.R. 46.2. 
Because there are no substantial parameters on what constitutes a "contact" 
under I.C. § 18-920 and !.C.R. 46.2, the potential for arbitrary or discriminatory 
enforcement is very high. Adding to that potential is the fact that a criminal no contact 
order may be entered when a defendant has been charged or convicted of any offense 
so long as the district court finds that a no contact order is "appropriate." I.C. § 18-
920(1 ). This vests this district court with unfettered discretion in making the 
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determination as to when a no contact order is appropriate. Additionally, there is no 
requirement of any relation between the person with whom the defendant is precluded 
from contacting and the underlying charge. I.C. § 18-920. A criminal statute is void for 
vagueness if the statute fails to provide minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement 
such that the statute's language "allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue 
their personal predilections." Ko/ender, 461 U.S. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 
U.S. 566, 575 (1974)). Idaho Code § 18-920 and I.C.R. 46.2 provide no meaningful 
guidelines to govern those charged with executing the statute and places unlimited 
discretion in the hands of those charged with executing and enforcing these provisions. 
Therefore this statute and court rule are unconstitutionally vague. 
The statute and rule governing no contact orders do not provide sufficient 
guidance as would provide a person of ordinary intelligence the ability to discern what 
conduct is permitted and what conduct is potentially criminal. Additionally, I.C. § 18-920 
and I.C.R. 46.2 provide absolutely no meaningful guidelines to govern the courts 
regarding proper execution and enforcement of these provisions. As such, I.C. § 18-
920 and !.C.R. 46.2 are unconstitutionally vague. 
3. The Specific Terms Of The No Contact Order Entered Against Mr. Cobler 
Are Unconstitutionally Vague As Applied The Facts And Circumstances Of 
This Case 
Mr. Cobler next contends that the specific terms of the no contact order that was 
entered against him by the district court are impermissibly vague and fail to provide him 
fair notice as to what conduct is proscribed. As currently written, the no contact order 
entered against Mr. Cobler will be nearly impossible to comply with upon his release 
back into the community and this near impossibility of compliance creates the potential 
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for police to have unbridled discretion in determining whether to arrest him for a 
violation of the order. 
When a defendant asserts that a statute is vague as applied to the facts of his or 
her particular case, he or she must demonstrate that the statute "failed to provide fair 
notice that the defendant's conduct was proscribed or failed to provide sufficient 
guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion in determining whether to arrest 
him." Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132. 
The specific provisions of the no contact order entered against Mr. Cobler 
demonstrate, in stark clarity, the vagueness of the scope of criminal no contact order 
that continues to be in place against him. As noted in the earlier discussion of the 
overbreadth of the order, Mr. Cobler's no contact order applies to a very broad class of 
persons: anyone who is under the age of 18. (R., p.7.) The order and the statute that 
authorized its entry have no language requiring any particular mental state that 
accompanies the alleged contact. I.C. § 18-920. (R., p.7.) There are no provisions 
regarding inadvertent or incidental contacts. (R., p.7.) There are no provisions 
regarding the passive receipt of a message or contact that has been initiated by another 
person who is under the age of 18. (R., p.7.) 
It is entirely possible that Mr. Cobler could be in technical violation of this order if 
he calls to order a pizza and speaks to an individual who has not yet turned 18, even if 
Mr. Cobler were entirely unaware of this fact. He would also likely find himself in 
violation of this order if he goes to the grocery store, any fast food restaurant, or indeed 
any establishment that could employ a person who is under the age of 18. The terms of 
his no contact order would essentially require Mr. Cobler to never leave his home and 
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enter a public place lest he inadvertently have contact with someone who has not yet 
turned 18 years old. Similarly, if a telemarketer were to call Mr. Cobler, and the 
telemarketer is under the age of 18, Mr. Cobler would technically be in violation of the 
no contact order by the simple act of picking up his phone. 
It is of no accord that actual prosecution for such violations would be unlikely. 
The crucial fact with regard to this order is that, under the scope of the order as it exists 
now, Mr. Cobler would have no meaningful way of determining in advance what 
constitutes a violation and what does not. Additionally, he would be entirely at the 
mercy of the discretion of any police officer or prosecutor should he be mistaken as to 
what is prohibited under this order. Under these facts, the no contact order entered 
against Mr. Cobler is clearly unconstitutionally vague in that it fails to provide fair notice 
as to the conduct proscribed and fails to provide any guidelines limiting discretion in 
determining whether to arrest him for a violation. See Ko/ender, 461 U.S. at 360-362. 
D. The District Court Failed To Act Within The Bounds Of Its Discretion When It 
Entered A No Contact Order Against Mr. Cobler That ls An Unconstitutional 
Infringement Upon His Fundamental Rights As A Parent. And When The District 
Court Denied Mr. Cobler's Motion To Modify The No Contact Order 
1. Summary Entry Of The No Contact Order Against Mr. Cobler Violated His 
Fundamental Rights As A Parent 
Mr. Cobler asserts that the no-contact order entered against him in this case is 
an unconstitutional interference with his fundamental rights as a parent. Moreover, 
because the no-contact order in this case was issued summarily by the district court 
during Mr. Cobler's video arraignment, with no substantial consideration of whether the 
State had established by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that this order was 
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needed for the protection of Mr. Cobler's children, the no contact order in this case also 
violated Mr. Cobler's due process rights. 
The right of parents to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of 
their children has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme 
Court as a fundamental right. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Leavitt v. 
Leavitt, 142 Idaho 664, 670, 132 P.3d 421, 427 (2006). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment provides heightened protections against governmental 
interference where fundamental rights and liberty interests are at stake. Troxel, 530 
U.S. at 65. The interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is 
"perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests," recognized by the courts. Id. 
This interest includes the right of parents to "establish a home and bring up children." 
Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). A strict prohibition against a 
parent having any contact whatsoever with his or her child is necessarily an interference 
with this fundamental right. As such, the imposition of the no contact order issued in 
this case is subject to the strict requirements of due process since the terms of that 
order interfere with Mr. Cobler's fundamental rights as a parent. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has established that the State may not interfere with 
the exercise of the fundamental rights of a parent absent clear and convincing proof that 
the State's action is necessary for the protection or best interests of the child. In the 
Interests of Doe, 144 Idaho 534, 164 P.3d 814 (2007) (State action terminating a 
parent's rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence); Leavitt, 142 Idaho 
at 670, 132 P.3d at 427 (applying clear and convincing evidence standard to decisions 
regarding the visitation rights of grandparents); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
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745, 747-748 (1982). Here, the State presented no such proof in support of the 
issuance of a no contact order that prohibited Mr. Cobler from engaging in nearly any 
exercise of his fundamental rights to parent his children. 
At his arraignment, the district court was made aware of two of Mr. Cobler's three 
minor children. (10/17/06 Tr., p.5, L.8.) The State asked for a no-contact order against 
Mr. Cobler that prevented him from having contact "with the victim or any minor children 
until the risk can be assessed." (10/17/06 Tr., p.6, Ls.9-11 (emphasis added).) The 
court initially stated that it would only order no contact with the alleged victim. (10/17/06 
Tr., p.7, Ls.6-8). However, despite knowing that Mr. Cobler had children that could be 
impacted by this order, the district court ultimately entered a no contact order that 
included both the alleged victim and "all minors." (R., p.7.) 
What is striking about this no contact order, beyond the fact that it presented an 
absolute bar against Mr. Cobler maintaining any and all contacts with his own children, 
is that the district court refused to permit any exceptions even for emergency situations. 
(R., p.7.) One of the enumerated exceptions denied by the district court was a provision 
that would have permitted Mr. Cobler to "respond to emergencies involving the natural 
or adopted children of both parties." (R., p.7.) As such, the district court's action in 
entering this order not only prevented Mr. Cobler from maintaining any contact with his 
own children, it also specifically denied him the right to respond to any exigencies that 
might otherwise arise with his children. 
In contrast to the near absolute deprivation of Mr. Cobler's parental rights is the 
complete absence of any specific justification therefore. The State requested this order 
be entered so that risk could be "assessed." (10/17/06 Tr., p.6, Ls.9-11.) This 
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statement is essentially an admission that the State had no substantial basis upon 
which to conclude that Mr. Cobler presented a threat to any person, much less to his 
own children. This falls far below the standard of clear and convincing proof that the no 
contact order was necessary for the protection or best interests of Mr. Cobler's children. 
The State also made no representations regarding Mr. Cobler's fitness as a parent or in 
any way implicated that his children were somehow at risk if they would be permitted to 
have contact with their father. (10/17/06 Tr., p.4, L.1 - p.7, L.12.) 
In light of the fact that no evidence was presented that the no contact order was 
necessary for the protection of Mr. Cobler's children, the State has violated Mr. Cobler's 
fundamental rights as a parent by entering a no contact order that precluded Mr. Cobler 
from all contacts with his children, and specifically denied him the ability to respond to 
emergency situations. 
This conclusion is supported by the findings of other jurisdictions regarding the 
constitutional pre-requisites for proper entry of a no-contact order that prohibits a parent 
from maintaining contact with his or her children. Regarding the entry of no contact 
orders preventing parents from contacting their children, Washington courts have held 
that the fundamental right to parent can be constitutionally restricted by a condition of a 
criminal sentence only if the condition is reasonably necessary to prevent harm to the 
children. See State v. Ancira, 27 P.3d 1246, 1248 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); State v. 
LeToumeau, 997 P.2d 436, 445 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). Notably, the court in 
LeToumeau concluded that merely being charged or convicted of a sexual offense was 
insufficient to prevent a parent from having unsupervised conduct with his or her 
children in absence of a specific showing that there was evidence that the defendant 
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was a pedophile or posed a danger of molesting her children. LeTourneau, 997 P.2d at 
446. Washington courts apply this standard to the imposition of no contact orders 
against a parent. Ancira, 27 P.3d at 1248. This Court should note that there was a 
specific finding in the psychosexual evaluation that Mr. Cobler is not a sexual predator. 
(Psychosexual Evaluation (attached to PSI), p.13.) While the evaluation determined 
that Mr. Cobler is attracted to adolescent females, the report noted that such attraction 
is "not unusual for his gender and age group." (Psychosexual Evaluation, p.13.) 
In light of established precedent regarding the fundamental rights of a parent. 
and persuasive precedent specifically addressing criminal no contact orders that 
interfere with this right, the district court violated Mr. Cobler's fundamental constitutional 
rights as a parent, and his Due Process rights flowing therefrom, when it summarily 
entered the no contact order at issue in this case. 
2. Summary Denial Of The Motion To Modify The No Contact Order Entered 
Against Mr. Cobler Violated His Fundamental Rights As A Parent 
As previously noted, the State may not interfere with the exercise of the 
fundamental rights of a parent absent clear and convincing proof that the State's action 
is necessary for the protection or best interests of the child. In the Interests of Doe, 144 
Idaho at 536, 164 P.3d at 816; Leavitt, 142 Idaho at 670, 132 P.3d at 427; Santosky, 
455 U.S. at 747-748. Here, the district court summarily denied Mr. Cobler's motion to 
modify the no contact order which specifically brought to the court's attention that this 
order precluded Mr. Cobler from maintaining any contact with his children. (Motion to 
Modify Protection Order, pp.1-3.) The district court did not provide any reasoning or 
justification for this denial, and certainly does not appear to have considered whether 
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there was clear and convincing proof that continuation of the no contact order is 
necessary for the protection or best interests of the child. (Motion to Modify Protection 
Order, pp.1-3.) As such, the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
Mr. Cobler's motion to modify the no contact order because the district court failed to act 
within the bounds of applicable law. 
E. The District Court Failed To Act Within The Bounds Of Its Discretion When It 
Entered A No Contact Order Against Mr. Cobler That Is Invalid Because It 
Contains No Discernible Date Of Expiration 
Mr. Cobler contends that the no contact order entered against him is invalid 
because it contains no discernible date of expiration. The no contact ordered entered 
by the district court in this case states that the order expires "upon dismissal of this 
case." Because dismissal was stated as the condition precedent to the order expiring, 
and because no dismissal ever occurred in this case, there is no relevant date of 
expiration. Mr. Cobler contends that the no contact order entered against him is invalid 
because it contains no discernible date of expiration. 
This Court exercises free review over the question of whether a criminal no 
contact order is entered in compliance with relevant statutes and court rules. State v. 
Castro,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _, 2008 WL 204309, *2 (2008). Idaho Code§ 18-
920 permits the district court to enter a criminal no contact order when a defendant is 
charged with or convicted of one of the enumerated offenses or any offense for which 
the court finds that the no contact order is appropriate. J.C.§ 18-920(1). Idaho Criminal 
Rule 46.2 sets out the procedural requirements for entering a no contact order as 
authorized by J.C.§ 18-920. In 2004, the Idaho Supreme Court changed the language 
of I.C.R. 46.2 to require inclusion of a termination date. Castro, 2008 WL 204309 at *3. 
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In explaining this change, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that it was contrary to the 
interests of public policy to permit criminal no contact orders to remain in "enshrined 
perpetuity," while a defendant waits for the district court to terminate the order at some 
unknown point in the future. Id. In order to prevent this, the Court in Castro stated that 
it expected district courts in the future to provide a discernible termination date for no 
contact orders entered under I.C. § 18-920. Id. 
Here, the form used by the district court does not comply with requirement that 
the order contain a specific date of expiration. (R., p.7.) Perhaps misreading the 
language of I.C.R. 46.2, the form provides two check boxes: one for expiration on a 
specific date, and one for expiration upon dismissal of the case. (R., p.7.) The district 
court checked only the box providing for expiration upon dismissal of the case. 
(R., p.7.) Given that there was no dismissal of Mr. Cobler's criminal case, the district 
court's actions resulted in exactly the harm that the 2004 revisions of I.C.R. 46.2 sought 
to avoid - the entry of a no contact order that extends into perpetuity. 
The Castro Court has made clear that this result is exactly what was sought to be 
avoided when the Court amended I.C.R. 46.2 to require a termination date. The 
decision to amend the language of I.C.R. 46.2 was intended to require mandatory 
inclusion of an end date in no contact orders. Castro, 2008 WL 204309 at *3. While the 
wording of I.C.R. 46.2 stated that the order must contain a statement that it will expire 
on 11 :59 p.m. on a specific date, or upon dismissal of the case, the language regarding 
dismissal of the case was clearly not intended to provide a mechanism to avoid the 
requirement of stating a definite date of termination in light of the Court's strong 
language in Castro. Applying the rule of lenity, and the Supreme Court's stated 
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reasoning behind the modification to I.C.R. 46.2, the only reasonable interpretation of 
this provision is that the no contact order is valid until the mandatory stated date of 
expiration, unless the district court dismisses the case before the date of expiration. 
In light of the reasoning behind I.C.R. 46.2 as stated in Castro, the no contact 
order entered by the district court is invalid because it fails to contain a specific date of 
expiration. 
F. The District Court Failed To Act Within The Bounds Of Its Discretion When It 
Entered A No Contact Order Against Mr. Cobler That Is Invalid Because It 
Contains A Prohibition Against Contacts With A Class Of Persons Rather Than 
Just A Named Person 
Mr. Cobler asserts that, because the no contact order was entered against 
contacts of a class of persons, rather than just an individual person, the no contact 
order unlawfully exceeded the scope of the authority conferred under I.C. § 18-920. 
While the no contact order issued in this case does contain one named person against 
whom contact is prohibited, the alleged victim in this case, the order proceeds to 
prohibit contacts against a very broad class of persons: all minors. (R., p.7.) The 
provision forbidding all contact with all minors is outside the scope of what contacts may 
be lawfully prohibited pursuant to I.C. § 18-920. 
Under the language of I.C. § 18-920, the court may issue a criminal no contact 
order "forbidding contact with another person." I.C. § 18-920(1) (emphasis added). In 
describing what constitutes a violation of a no contact order, this statute further states 
that the person charged with violating the order must have "had contact with the stated 
person in violation of the order." I.C. § 18-920(2)(c) (emphasis added). This language 
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clearly limits the scope of whom no contact orders may be entered in favor of to 
individual persons, and not classes of persons. 
This interpretation is consistent with the common definition of "person." A 
"person" is commonly defined as a human or an individual. See Merriam-Webster 
Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionarylperson. This also comports with the 
general legal understanding of the term "person" as "a human being." Black's Law 
Dictionary 1178 (Bryan Garner, ed., 8th ed., West 1999). Moreover, the rule of lenity 
requires that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant. See, 
e.g., State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 325, 806 P.2d 413, 418 (1990). Applying a strict 
construction to the language of I.C. § 18-920, no contact orders may only be issued if 
they prohibit the defendant from contacting an individual person. There is no 
authorization for entering a no contact order prohibiting contact against an entire class 
of persons, particularly not one so broad as "all minors." 
· The no contact order in this case is invalid to the extent that it prohibits contacts 
with a class of persons rather than just a stated individual. As such, the district court 
abused its discretion when it refused to modify the no contact order as requested by 
Mr. Cobler. 
G. Conclusion 
The no contact order entered against Mr. Cobler by the district court is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; and also violates Mr. Cobler's fundamental 
constitutional rights as a parent. The no contact order at issue in this case is also 
invalid because it contains no date of expiration and is entered in favor of a class of 
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persons rather than a named person. As such, the district court abused its discretion 
when it entered this order, and when it denied Mr. Cobler's motion to modify the order. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten 
Years. With Two Years Fixed. Upon Mr. Cobler Following His Plea Of Guilty To Sexual 
Battery Of A Minor Child. Sixteen Or Seventeen Years Of Age 
Mr. Cobler asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten 
years, with two years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771,653 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294, 939 P.2d 
1372, 1373 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71, 75 
(1979)). Mr. Cobler does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. 
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Cobler must show that in light 
of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. 
Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141,145,814 P.2d 401,405 (1991), overruled 
on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992)). The 
governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) 
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; 
and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 
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382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978)). This Court reviews the length of the entire 
sentence on review of whether that sentence is excessive. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 
722, 725, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 
Mr. Cobler was the victim of a violent and unstable childhood. (PSI, pp.11-12.) 
He spent much of his formative years in foster care and in group homes. (PSI, p.11.) 
His mother neglected him when he was very young, and most of the care he received 
was from his aunts, uncles, and his grandmother. (PSI, p.11.) His father was not 
present in Mr. Cobler's life until he was eight years old. (PSI, p.11.) From this time on, 
Mr. Cobler appears to have been bounced around from home to home without much 
stability or guidance for any significant period of time. (PSI, p.11.) 
Mr. Cobler lived with his father for several years. (PSI, p.11.) He was mentally 
and physically abused by his father from the time he was eight until he was 14 years 
old. (PSI, p.11.) His father would often beat and choke Mr. Cobler, breaking his nose 
on more than one occasion. (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Cobler's father also hit him over the head 
with a cinder block. (PSI, p.11.) 
Mr. Cobler appeared to have one year of respite from his history of neglect and 
abuse when he was sent to live with his aunt and his grandmother. (PSI, p.11.) 
However, that period was short-lived, and he was returned to his mother's custody. 
(PSI, p.11.) He lived with his mother and her boyfriend for only a short time as a 
teenager. (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Cobbler's mother was an alcoholic who drank frequently 
during the time that Mr. Cobbler lived with her. (PSI, p.12.) He was abused and 
neglected while in his mother's custody. (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Cobler's mother also placed 
him in a mental hospital. (PSI, p.11.) Sadly, Mr. Cobler recalls this mental hospital as 
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one of the first non-abusive environments that he had ever known as a child. (PSI, 
p.12.) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Cobler was removed from his mother's home due to the 
neglect and abuse that he suffered under her care. (PSI, p.11.) He spent time in a 
group home, and then was placed in his aunt's care until he turned 18. (PSI, p.11.) 
Mr. Cobler's judgment was impaired by marijuana when he first engaged sexually 
with the victim, and he was not aware until several months later that she was younger 
than 18 years old. (PSI, p.9.) Moreover, an examination of Mr. Cobler's criminal history 
demonstrates that he has no prior record of any sexual offense, and it is unclear 
whether Mr. Cobler has any record of prior felony offenses. 6 (PSI, p.10.) 
Despite his own history of abuse at the hands of his parents, or perhaps because 
of it, Mr. Cobler is a man who is dedicated to his family. The most important value to 
Mr. Cobler is family. (PSI, p.19.) He has repeatedly emphasized his love for his wife 
and his children. (PSI, pp.19-20.) Mr. Cobler also has expressed his remorse to the 
court for the harm that his actions have caused, including the harm suffered by the 
members of his family. (PSI, pp.19-20.) 
Mr. Cobler's behavior in this case is partially attributable to his poor impulse 
control and his attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. (Psychosexual Evaluation, pp.3-
4.) Although not a defense to his crime, Mr. Cobler was also unaware that the victim in 
this case was under the age of 18. (PSI, p.4.) 
Moreover, Mr. Cobler has not had the opportunity to participate in any 
psychological counseling or therapy as an adult, and received only intermittent mental 
6 Mr. Cobler appears to have two prior convictions from Kansas for possession of marijuana and criminal 
trespass. However, the PSI does not indicate whether these offenses were felonies or misdemeanors. 
(PSI, p.10.) These offenses appear to be self-reported by Mr. Cobler. (PSI, p.11.) 
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health treatment as a teenager. (Psy . hosexual Evaluation, p.5.) Given the history of 
violence that Mr. Cobler endured duri<J his formative years, it is not surprising that his 
psychosexual evaluation indicated the, mental health therapies could be a useful tool for 
Mr. Cobler's rehabilitation. (Psychose ual Evaluation, pp.16-18.) 
Moreover. Mr. Cobler's psych, sexual evaluation indicates that any danger that 
Mr. Cobler presents to society could ;;,ely be ameliorated through outpatient treatment 
rather than incarceration. His evalua ·)n indicated that he was at only a moderate risk 
of reoffense, bui further stated that U· , risk could be significantly reduced if Mr. Cobler 
participated in treatment. (Psych,.•sexual Evaluation, p.13.) The psychosexual 
evaluation also ,;oncluded that Mr. Cnbler is not a sexual predator; a conclusion that is 
supported by his lack of any prior sirn:!ar offenses in his criminal record. (Psychosexual 
Evaluation, pp.·15-16.) Based on an assessment of relevant factors, the evaluation 
concluded that Mr. Cobler was "a good candidate for outpatient specialized sexual 
offender treatment," and further stated that his rehabilitation through treatment could be 
done on an outpatient basis while Mr. Cobler was released into the community. 
(Psychosexual Evaluation, pp.15-16.) 
Under any reasonable view of the facts, the information before the district court 
at sentencing indicates that Mr. Cobler was not such a danger to the public at large that 
a unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, was required. In fact, it appears 
that the protection of society and the potential for Mr. Cobler's successful rehabilitation 
would both be served by his participation in outpatient mental health and sexual 
offender treatments that could be provided upon his release into the community. 
Because the district court's sentence was excessive in light of the relevant statutory 
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factors and the facts of this case, the district court abused its discretion when it 
sentenced Mr. Cobler to ten years, with two years fixed. 
Ill. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Cobler's Rule 35 Motion 
For A Reduction Of Sentence 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 
125 Idaho 251, 253, 869 P.2d 568, 570 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 
21, 740 P.2d 63 (Ct. App.1987) and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 680 P.2d 869 
(Ct. App. 1984)). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are 
the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was 
reasonable." Id. (citing Lopez, 106 Idaho at 450, 680 P.2d at 872). "If the sentence was 
not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in 
view of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id. (citing 
State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 822 P.2d 1011 (Ct. App. 1991)). 
As an initial matter, this Court should note that Mr. Cobler's Rule 35 motion for 
reduction of his sentence was supported by new and additional information. In his Rule 
35 motion, Mr. Cobler repeatedly asserted his honest remorse for his actions and 
accepted responsibility for his crime. (Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence, 
pp.1-8.) This demonstrates that Mr. Cobler made the important realization as to the 
harms of his actions, and further demonstrates Mr. Cobler's progress towards his 
rehabilitation. 
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Mr. Cobler also provided the district court with a report on the considerable 
progress that he had made during his time of incarceration. He reported that he had no 
infractions and was a model prisoner during his entire time of incarceration. (Motion for 
Correction or Reduction of Sentence, p.7.) Mr. Cobler also informed the district court 
that he had signed up for all of the recommended classes and had made substantial 
progress in several courses already. (Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence, 
p.7.) Many of these courses focused upon long-term changes to Mr. Cobler's thinking 
and behavioral patterns, and the information that Mr. Cobler has gleaned from these 
courses will no doubt help to ensure that he does not commit any similar offenses in the 
future. (Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence, p.7.) Moreover, Mr. Cobler's 
sincere desire to one day be reunited with his family has also been an important 
motivator since his time of incarceration that drives him to seek to permanently change 
his life and his behavior for the better. (Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence, 
p.7.) 
The new and additional information provided to the district court, along with the 
record as a whole in this case, demonstrates that Mr. Cobler is not such a significant 
threat to the community that a sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, is either 
necessary or appropriate in this case. Moreover, a reduction of Mr. Cobler's sentence 
is also appropriate in light of the related factors of rehabilitation, retribution and 
deterrence. As such, the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Cobler's 
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of his sentence. 
35 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Cobler respectfully requests that this Court vacate the no contact order 
entered against him. Mr. Cobler further respectfully requests that this Court reduce his 
sentence as it deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his 
Rule 35 motion be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 10th day of April, 2008. 
Legal Intern 
SARA B. THOMAS 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
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